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Jim Crow Democracy: The U.S. South and 






Segregationist politicians from the U.S. South played key roles in 
devising plans for the reconstruction of Germany, the Marshall Plan 
and the drafting of displaced persons legislation. This article discusses 
how their Jim Crow ideology calibrated the global and domestic order 
that emerged from the ashes of World War II. Southern advocates of 
this ideology dealt with national and foreign issues from a regional per-
spective, which was based on the protection of agricultural interests 
and a nascent military-industrial complex, but above all, on the defence 
of white supremacy. In general, they followed a lenient course toward 
Germany after the country’s defeat in World War II, for various rea-
sons. The shared experience of post-war reconstruction, containment 
of communism and feelings of kinship between the Germanic people 
and the Anglo-Saxons of the U.S. South were some of the motives why 
many white southerners did not endorse punitive measures against the 
former enemy. For them, an obvious connection existed between the 
local and the global, which strongly reverberated in the formation of 
U.S. foreign and domestic policy in the post-war world. The rebuilding 
of Germany and the fugitive question were shaped on the basis of a Jim 
Crow blueprint.
Keywords: anti-communism, Cold War, Marshall Plan, racialization, 
refugees, U.S. South
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Introduction: the U.S. South in the World
In December 1933 manufacturers from the U.S. South founded the 
Southern States Industrial Council (SSIC). The initial goal of the 
organization was to protect southern business interests within the New 
Deal framework. After World War II, it became an advocate of a typical 
form of southern free enterprise, based on minimal federal  regulations, 
limited government spending, anti-communism, strict immigration 
laws and a devotion to racial segregation.1 These subjects often figured 
prominently in the Bulletin, the newsletter of the SSIC. The issue of 
15 July 1957 for instance contained excerpts from a speech by U.S. 
Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia, who criticized ‘the panicky and 
unstable’ foreign policy of the United States as being too complacent 
to demands of the Soviet Union. Council president Martin Condon 
defended the McCarran-Walter Act, a very restrictive immigration bill 
passed by Congress in 1952 over President Harry Truman’s veto, while 
columnist Thurman Sensing denounced the Supreme Court as a Marxist 
outfit that had illegally declared segregation in public schools uncon-
stitutional and limited congressional authority to investigate subver-
sive activities. According to Sensing, the verdict to desegregate educa-
tion was an ‘uncalled-for, radical, communist-pleasing decision of the 
Supreme Court’. Condon similarly claimed communists were trying to 
‘emasculate [the McCarran-Walter Act] and to open the flood-gates to 
foreign immigration’. Anti-communism was the common  denominator 
for the segregationist, nativist and capitalist sentiments that charac-
terized the ‘America First’ agenda of the Southern States Industrial 
Council.2
The SSIC newsletter demonstrates how the context of the global 
Cold War determined southern ideas about national and international 
developments. During the last decades, such a global dimension has 
increasingly taken centre stage in scholarship on the U.S. South.3 
Researchers have successfully applied the concept of the ‘Global 
South’ to the history of slavery, of antebellum southern nationalism 
(and secession) and of the civil rights movement.4 Although the histo-
riography on the transnational aspects of the black freedom struggle is 
more extensive, the interconnections between southern segregation and 
white supremacy abroad have not gone unnoticed either. Foreign pol-
icy scholars such as Thomas Borstelmann, Gerald Horne and Andrew 
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DeRoche have written important books about U.S. relations with south-
ern Africa, where white minorities controlled countries such as South 
Africa and Rhodesia. Borstelmann’s work The Cold War and the Color 
Line investigates how the U.S. government responded to demands for 
racial equality at home and abroad during the Cold War. ‘The essential 
strategy of American Cold Warriors was to try to manage and control 
the efforts of racial reformers at home and abroad, thereby minimizing 
provocation to the forces of white supremacy and colonialism while 
encouraging gradual change’, Borstelmann argued. In his book, he 
rightfully points out how students of U.S. foreign policy have generally 
neglected ‘domestic realities’, while historians of the civil rights era 
have often presented the movement as uniquely American, thus ignor-
ing the battle against colonial regimes that was raging at the same time.5
In contrast with Borstelmann’s emphasis on presidential administra-
tions, historian Stephanie Rolph takes a more grassroots approach in 
her examination of Citizens’ Council support for scientific racism and 
African apartheid regimes. The Citizens’ Council was a white suprema-
cist organization founded in the U.S. South after the Supreme Court 
had ruled segregated public education unconstitutional in 1954. Rolph 
intends to bring ‘white fears of racial equality into better focus … from 
this viewpoint, dismantling legal segregation and extending political 
equality could only result in tyranny and violence against whites every-
where’. Segregationists and supporters of white control more generally 
operated across regional and national borders within a ‘global ecosys-
tem of white supremacy’, Rolph argued.6 She convincingly exposes the 
importance of white privilege in the contemporary conservative move-
ment in the United States and the transnational outlook of the Citizens’ 
Council.7 However, in her article Rolph primarily concentrates on alli-
ances white supremacists from the U.S. forged with kindred spirits in 
Africa, which limits the truly global scope of segregationist ideology to 
specific cases on one continent.
White supremacist causes in Rhodesia and South Africa somewhat 
resembled the domestic defence of Jim Crow apartheid. Historian 
Stephen Berrey defined the system of Jim Crow as a racialized social 
structure whose objective was ‘to solidify and extend white political 
and economic power’. It did not just preserve white supremacy through 
politics and law, but also functioned as a cultural system, in ‘daily per-
formances of race’.8 Comparable systems existed in southern Africa, 
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which explains why historians interested in the foreign dimensions of 
U.S. segregation devote so much attention to the African continent. But 
southern segregationists had a much broader range of global interests 
than just Africa. Politicians from the Jim Crow South for instance played 
important roles in drafting reconstruction proposals for Germany, the 
Marshall Plan and displaced persons legislation, all based on their racial-
ized belief system. ‘Dixie’s congressmen furnished crucial leadership 
and support for confronting international Communism and implement-
ing containment’, historian Joseph Fry wrote about the South’s sub-
stantial impact on U.S. conduct in the Cold War. Southern Democrats 
‘endorsed and managed congressional approval of the United Nations, 
the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO’.9 Post-war Europe 
occupied a prominent place in the foreign policy agenda of the white 
South. Racialized ideas about foreign aid, the Soviet communist threat 
and the refugee situation undergirded this agenda. Southern politicians 
wanted to safeguard Jim Crow democracy at home and simultaneously 
export its main tenets abroad.
Racialized Policy-Making
The following focuses on U.S. responses to developments in Europe 
in the direct aftermath of World War II. I argue that race was central to 
key decisions concerning Europe during this period and that southern 
lawmakers played an important role in drafting these decisions. This 
article thus complements the work done by scholars on U.S. race-based 
attitudes toward Africa during the Cold War, where the colour line fig-
ured prominently. Traditional explanations for U.S. aid to post-war 
Europe often combine humanitarian considerations, economic inter-
ests and containment of communism. For committed southern segre-
gationists, something much more significant was at stake: the survival 
of Western civilization, which they defined as white. Racial concerns 
were therefore of crucial importance to them in the reconstruction of 
Germany, their support for the Marshall Plan and their involvement in 
the European refugee question. They successfully found allies outside 
the South to implement their anti-communist free enterprise agenda, 
which essentially served one goal: to make the world safe for Jim Crow 
democracy.
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In their work on racial formation, sociologists Michael Omi and 
Howard Winant use the concept of racialization to explain how mean-
ing is attached to human physical features, in this case skin colour. 
‘Conscious or unconscious, deeply ingrained or reinvented, the making 
of race, the “othering” of social groups by means of the invocation of 
physical distinctions, is a key component of modern societies’, they 
write. According to them, racialization was central to the organiza-
tion of the modern world-system. Until this day, we are dealing with 
the racialized legacies of this history, which fundamentally revolved 
around conquest and exploitation. ‘Racial categories, and the meanings 
attached to them, are often constructed from pre-existing conceptual or 
discursive elements that have crystallized through the genealogies of 
competing religious, scientific, and political ideologies and projects’, 
Omi and Winant elucidate the historical dimension of racialization.10
With its long history of large-scale slavery and institutionalized seg-
regation, extreme forms of racialization structured society in the U.S. 
South. Its white supremacist mindset nonetheless became a U.S. export 
product in the post-war era. First of all, as Joseph Fry already indicated, 
southern lawmakers occupied congressional positions of power in the 
fields of foreign policy and national security. In the second place, white-
ness was a constituent element of the national self-image, which meant 
that diluted forms of southern racial extremism could easily blend with 
dominant forms of U.S. identity. Finally, racialization was also integral 
to processes of national self-definition and the creation of so-called col-
lective ‘cultural archives’ in Europe.11 ‘Especially since the imperial 
dawn, the ideas of race and nation have been deeply connected, mainly 
through concepts of peoplehood’, Omi and Winant explain.12 In other 
words, Jim Crow democracy could effectively be channelled to other 
parts of the nation and other parts of the globe, especially through its 
association with anti-communism and free enterprise.
German Reconstruction and the Marshall Plan
On 26 May 1945, eight U.S. senators of the Committee on Naval Affairs 
landed at Orly Airfield in Paris, France. After touring the D-Day beaches 
in Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge area in Luxembourg, the 
group travelled to Germany. Six of the eight senators were Democrats 
Zwiers
552 HCM 2019, VOL. 7
from the U.S. South: Harry Byrd of Virginia, Burnet Maybank of South 
Carolina, John McClellan of Arkansas, Tom Stewart of Tennessee, 
Richard Russell of Georgia and James Eastland of Mississippi. Many 
of them could readily identify with the destruction they saw in the 
defeated Third Reich. These men had grown up with the mythology of 
the Lost Cause, a rendition of history that presented the Confederate war 
effort as a noble struggle for independence against tyranny. Lost Cause 
apologists considered the post-Civil War period a tragic and chaotic 
era when former slaves and Yankee sympathizers ruled their destroyed 
homeland. With the Red Army standing at the gates of Western Europe, 
segregationists from the U.S. South believed that yet another battle for 
the survival of (what they called) white civilization was at hand.13
When they returned to the United States, these southern politicians 
were convinced they had to fight for a lenient reconstruction policy of 
Germany. The defence of whiteness, anti-communism and the revival 
of a European free market economy formed the core of their arguments. 
Capitalism and Jim Crow democracy thus merged in their vision of 
a post-war world. This vision was diametrically opposed to the plans 
of Henry Morgenthau, Franklin Roosevelt’s Secretary of Finance. 
Morgenthau was the son of a Jewish real estate tycoon from New 
York City and became part of the Roosevelt administration in 1933. In 
1944 he drafted a proposal about what should happen with the Third 
Reich after Nazi defeat, titled ‘Suggested Post-Surrender Program for 
Germany’. Morgenthau’s basic premise was that Germany should never 
again be capable of waging war. Its major industries should be disman-
tled and the country should be turned into a pastoral state. Roosevelt 
and Churchill initially favoured the so-called ‘industrial disarmament’ 
of Germany.14 When propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels heard 
about the plan, he used it in his efforts to rally the German population 
behind the ‘Totaler Krieg’. According to Goebbels, ‘the American Jew 
Morgenthau’ wanted to turn Germany into a giant potato field.15
The idea to make Germany ‘primarily agricultural and pastoral in 
character’ met fierce opposition from southern segregationists. U.S. 
Representative Bill Colmer of Mississippi, the Democratic chairman of 
the Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, led 
a congressional delegation on a two-month fact-finding tour through 
Europe in the fall of 1945. The delegates also interviewed Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin during their trip. In November, Colmer issued a scath-
ing condemnation of U.S. policy in Germany: he believed an economic 
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recovery program should be established as soon as possible to combat 
the starvation and economic distress that was rampant in the country.16
Other southern politicians fell in line with the conclusions of the 
Colmer report. Senator Eastland called upon the administration to stop 
the ‘policy of vindictive hatred’ that caused ‘grave hardship, starvation, 
and human suffering’. Germany was the ‘industrial heart of Europe’ 
and ‘the neutralizing agent between the Oriental hordes [i.e. Russian 
communists] and a western civilization 2000 years old’. The establish-
ment of a strong German economy was necessary because there could 
‘be no sound, permanent peacetime prosperity in the United States until 
the economy of Europe is put upon a sound permanent basis’. Eastland 
also believed communist rule was ‘the first time in the Christian era that 
the doctrine of slavery has been adopted as applied to the white race… 
We are abandoning the principles of Christian civilization, for not since 
the days of Nero have Christians been treated so cruelly’ by the Soviet 
Union, a ‘predatory, aggressor nation’ in the words of Eastland.17 In the 
end, under growing pressure from the South and other parts of the coun-
try, the U.S. government decided to abandon the Morgenthau Plan.18
As an outspoken anti-communist advocate of white supremacy, 
Eastland racialized containment of the Soviet threat. He described 
Germany as the defender of Western civilization, Christianity and a 
free market economy, while Russian Marxism was an oriental ideol-
ogy aimed at aggressive expansion and the enslavement of white peo-
ple. By calling communism oriental, Eastland automatically defined it 
as non-white and triggered time-honoured ‘yellow peril tropes’ stored 
in the U.S. cultural archive. Such rhetorical strategies became an 
inherent part of post-war American conservatism.19 At the same time, 
Eastland adapted racialized ideas about presumed communist affini-
ties in the African American civil rights movement and applied them 
in the debate on the reconstruction of Germany.20 In doing so, he made 
the defence of white supremacy in the U.S. South part of a global fight 
for the basic tenets of Western civilization. In this fight, people of colour 
were framed as having a stronger proclivity for Marxism, while whites 
stood for democracy and free enterprise. Eastland received wide praise 
for his Germany speech from all parts of the country. ‘In condemning 
the  un-American and unchristian conditions imposed upon the German 
people you have the wholehearted support of millions of your fellow 
citizens’, a resident of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania wrote the Mississippi 
senator.21
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The reconstruction of Germany became part of a much larger 
attempt to rejuvenate the post-war economy of war-ravaged Europe. 
The South’s support for the implementation of this European Recovery 
Program (ERP, better known as the Marshall Plan) was again cru-
cial. In the spring of 1947, Dean Acheson, Truman’s undersecretary 
of state, travelled to Greenville, a bustling city located in the heart of 
the Mississippi Delta. Acheson’s hosts organized a traditional south-
ern dinner party for their distinguished guest that night, complete 
with mint juleps. The next morning, exactly two years after VE-Day, 
Acheson travelled north through the cotton fields, to the small town 
of Cleveland, where the Delta Council held its annual meeting. The 
Council was an organization of planters and small entrepreneurs who 
lived and worked in the fertile Black Belt along the Mississippi River, 
an area that stretched from Memphis all the way down to Vicksburg. 
‘Most of them have a world outlook and a modern attitude toward agri-
culture’, Acheson’s assistant Joseph Jones described the Council mem-
bers. ‘Cotton remains the main crop, and cotton requires world markets, 
hence the traditional internationalism of the delta’.22
It was a typical spring day in the Deep South: hot and humid. A 
large crowd of farmers awaited Acheson in the gymnasium of what 
is now known as Delta State University. Since the beginning of April 
1947, Jones had been working on a speech for his boss about America’s 
responsibility in the reconstruction of Europe. Besides mentioning 
the leadership of the United States in the global fight for democracy, 
Acheson instructed Jones to emphasize economic self-interest and 
national security as well. The discussion of a new role for Germany 
in the European recovery plan formed a central element of the speech. 
U.S. officials no longer wanted to treat the Germans as enemies who 
should suffer for past sins, but as possible allies in the emerging Cold 
War.23 ‘It is clear, therefore, that in order to promote political stability, 
in order to preserve democratic institutions in the world, in order to 
create economic bases for peace, and in order to protect our domestic 
economy’, Jones explained, ‘it is clear that for all these reasons we must 
be prepared in the years to come to extend financial and economic assis-
tance to the world on a scale which we have not hitherto considered’.24
The audience listened attentively as Acheson stressed the urgency of 
rebuilding Europe. According to the undersecretary, the United States 
not only had a moral obligation to enact such a program; it was also 
essential to contain the Soviet threat and secure foreign markets. ‘It is 
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necessary if we are to preserve our own freedoms and our own demo-
cratic institutions’, he said. ‘It is necessary for our national security. 
And it is our duty and our privilege as human beings’.25 The cotton 
planters greeted Acheson’s call for aid to Europe with applause. More 
than a third of cotton exports went to Western Europe. For farmers in 
the Delta, it was not difficult to see the link between European recov-
ery, anti-communism and their own economic well-being. Less than a 
month later, Secretary of State George Marshall officially announced 
the European Recovery Program in a speech at Harvard University. But 
Acheson had launched the trial balloon for the plan, in the heartland 
of the Jim Crow South, where just a few years later the first Citizens’ 
Councils emerged.26
The administration’s choice for Cleveland, Mississippi, as the site to 
introduce the ERP underscored the central position of agricultural exports 
in the program and it revealed the importance of southern support for the 
enactment of the project. Acheson’s trip to the Deep South was impera-
tive, because considerable opposition to the Marshall Plan still existed 
in the region.27 Segments of the southern electorate for instance did not 
understand why a former enemy should receive U.S. dollars to rebuild 
its economy, just two years after the war. Cullen Curlee, who ran James 
Eastland’s Mississippi office, wrote the senator that these voters did ‘not 
realize should we not contribute something to the upbuilding of the for-
eign countries it would result in a chaotic condition and the communists 
and Russians would be sure to take advantage of the situation blaming 
it all on us’. Curlee also mentioned how cotton exports from the South 
would suffer if Europe did not receive U.S. aid to revive its markets.28 
Such considerations, which revolved around the interplay between race, 
anti-communism and the creation of demand abroad for southern farm 
products, were enough reason for many legislators from the South to sup-
port the ERP.29 With the critical backing of Jim Crow Democrats secured, 
Congress passed the Marshall Plan in mid-1948.
Bloodstreams and Citizenship in the Displaced Persons 
Debate
In the eyes of Jim Crow apologists, only a strong Germany could form 
a white, Christian, capitalist bulwark against the expansion of oriental, 
atheistic communism. These ideas were subsequently transferred to the 
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European level, with the enactment of the ERP. Nothing less than the 
survival of western civilization was at stake. Such a worldview also 
defined the southern position in the displaced persons debate that took 
place in 1949 and 1950. In 1946, Harry Truman had already requested 
Congress to rewrite legislation for admitting displaced persons into the 
country. The president could finally sign a new bill two years later, but 
he was not very enthusiastic about it. The president had hoped Congress 
would design a lenient law with low entry requirements, but the power-
ful conservative caucus on Capitol Hill had other thoughts. These poli-
ticians were not very eager to open the borders for victims of World 
War II. The result was a very restrictive bill that set firm quotas on 
the admittance of displaced persons into the United States. Democratic 
Senator Pat McCarran, a reactionary rancher from Nevada, had senior 
status on the Judiciary Committee, which decides on immigration mat-
ters. McCarran in fact wanted to ship most refugees to Alaska and keep 
the American mainland free of displaced persons. After the Democratic 
victory in the 1948 elections, Truman expected that his party would 
draft a more liberal displaced persons (DP) law. Democrats were again 
in control of Congress, but not all of them fell in line with the presi-
dent’s wishes. Chairman McCarran was one of them.30
New York Representative Emanuel Celler and Senator J. Howard 
McGrath of Rhode Island took up the challenge to steer Truman’s 
plans through the House and Senate. The biggest obstacle for these two 
Democrats from the North was a subcommittee composed by McCarran 
that had to examine proposals for a revised DP law. Republican William 
Jenner of Indiana and Jim Crow Democrat James Eastland were members 
of this committee and they vehemently opposed liberal amendments to the 
act. After almost four months of hearings, Pat McCarran announced he had 
to go to Europe to personally examine the refugee situation in the region. 
His trip was a stalling strategy to keep the bill in committee. McCarran 
relied on senatorial courtesy that the full Senate would not debate new 
legislation when the chairman was away on a fact-finding mission.31
The Judiciary Committee finally submitted a DP bill on 24 January 
1950 for consideration by the Senate. Parts of the original proposal 
had made it through the subcommittee hearings, but Congressman 
Celler was not very content with the alterations to his bill and called 
it a fraud. The main reason for Celler’s objections were the subcom-
mittee’s attempts to broaden the definition of displaced persons. The 
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DP bill was initially intended to offer relief for victims of the Nazi 
regime, but McCarran’s amendments allowed the entry of refugees who 
were persecuted or feared persecution between 1 September 1939 and 
1 January 1949. The subcommittee also decided to retain specific quota 
arrangements from the original displaced persons act of 1948. These 
quotas favoured refugees coming from Europe and who were involved 
in agriculture. Especially German transplants in Eastern Europe ben-
efited from such provisions. These so-called Volksdeutsche were ethnic 
Germans who were born and living outside Germany. Many of them 
had fled their homeland after the post-war communist takeover. Jewish 
people became the victim of the subcommittee version of the Celler bill, 
because the preferential treatment of Germanic refugees decreased the 
number of Jewish fugitives eligible for entry into the United States.32
Senator Eastland strongly supported the positive discrimination of 
Germans from Soviet-occupied zones who wanted to come to the States. 
When the Senate discussed the displaced persons issue in October 1949, 
he stated that no single ‘group of people in the entire history of the 
world ever suffered more than they did’.33 A few months later, Eastland 
proudly claimed Germans resembled white southerners, who were ‘of as 
pure Anglo-Saxon blood as can be found in the United States’. Eastland 
thought that one ‘of the greatest crimes in all history was the uproot-
ing [of Germans] from their homes, where their people had lived for 
centuries, of men, women, and children, whose only offense was that 
through their veins flowed Germanic blood and that a thousand years 
ago their ancestors had been of German stock’.34 Herbert Lehman, a lib-
eral Democratic senator from New York, expressed strong criticism of 
Eastland’s statements. According to Lehman, McCarran and his allies 
on the Judiciary Committee attempted ‘to change the entire nature of 
the [DP] program from one of relief for displaced persons to one of 
relief of German expellees’.35
Opponents of a more tolerant displaced persons policy feared the 
influx of communist spies from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Richard Russell of Georgia, a Democrat and leader of the Southern 
Caucus in the U.S. Senate, had in fact received information about refu-
gees forging passports, college degrees, birth certificates and even fam-
ily Bibles. ‘It was my informant’s opinion that a great many of them 
were Russian agents and that they had been deliberately planted by the 
Russian Government in those positions [displaced persons camps], so 
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that they could go into the democracies who were accepting displaced 
persons, and could cause trouble there, through subversive activities’, 
Russell warned.36 Segregationists often linked ethnicity with the pro-
pensity for communist sympathies and the ability (or rather inability) 
to understand American political traditions. Jim Crow spokesmen 
claimed that minorities such as African Americans but also Jews were 
more open to Marxist ideology. Democratic Congressman John Rankin 
from Mississippi voiced this viewpoint in extreme language. He was 
once asked to bring a ‘Jew Communist’ to his home state, but Rankin 
declined, saying he did not want to pollute ‘the magnolia-scented sweet-
ness of pure Mississippi with a stench so foul that buzzards held their 
noses while flying over the Jew Communist meeting places’.37
Amy Kaplan has demonstrated how in the U.S. ‘domestic metaphors 
of national identity are intimately intertwined with renderings of the 
foreign and the alien’.38 Jim Crow Democrats followed a similar pat-
tern, preferring the immigration of groups with a kindred ethnic back-
ground as the Anglo-Saxons of the South. Senator Eastland for instance 
wanted to open U.S. borders for Germanic farmers, who he considered 
close to the white people of Mississippi. ‘Do Senators know that under 
this bill a person who took up arms against Russia when the Russian 
Armies invaded his country, and who fought to protect his country, is 
ineligible to come into the United States as a displaced person under the 
Celler bill which we are asked to pass’, Eastland asked his colleagues. 
He then declared that the liberal version of the DP bill was ‘founded in 
discrimination. It stinks of discrimination against loyal, patriotic groups 
who should be permitted to come here, and who would be an asset 
to our country’.39 Parts of the Volksdeutsche population had worked 
together with the Nazi regime. Eastland thought this stigma of collabo-
ration negatively affected the entire community after the war. For him, 
Germanic fugitives trying to escape communist oppression did not form 
a threat to the American Way of Life, which became very obvious when 
he compared them with refugees from Eastern and Central Europe of 
different ethnic stock. Senator Eastland was open to immigration, but 
the newcomers should have an ethnicity compatible with the WASP 
heritage of the South and the United States. Moreover, they should have 
clearly displayed their anti-communist sentiments. As tensions between 
Soviet Russia and the United States increased, Eastland was not the 
only American who voiced such opinions.
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The ideas expressed by Jim Crow politicians on the refugee situation 
fit into a wider regional worldview that had the Cold War as its frame-
work. The fear that alien forces wanted to destroy the Southern Way 
of Life was central to this system of thought. Moreover, high officials 
in the Truman administration had similar views. George Kennan for 
instance stated that the appeal of communism ‘was relatively strong to 
maladjusted groups – Jews, Negroes, immigrants – all those who feel 
handicapped in the framework of a national society’.40 U.S. citizens 
outside the South were also concerned about the influx of Jewish refu-
gees and their presumed communist sympathies. A woman from New 
York wrote: ‘The word “refugee” is synonymous with Jew, and the lat-
ter is synonymous with Red!’41 Others saw Jim Crow Democrats as 
custodians of American political traditions. A resident of Long Beach, 
California thought ‘that if this country can be saved, it will have to be 
done by southerners, as they have the most purely Anglo-Saxon view 
of government’.42
White southerners were therefore not the only ones who con-
nected ethnicity with subversive behaviour, but their representatives in 
Congress had the political power to influence legislation about refu-
gees and the economic reconstruction of Europe. On the basis of the 
system of seniority, many of them chaired congressional committees 
that directly dealt with Cold War issues, such as the Foreign Relations 
Committee and the Armed Services Committee.43 During the displaced 
persons debate, reactionary Republicans like William Jenner of Indiana 
banded together with conservative Democrats from the West and South 
to stand in the way of a liberal DP bill. In later years, these two regions, 
the West and the South, would of course form the bedrock of a revamped 
Republican Party.
In 1950, this conservative coalition was unable to prevent the pas-
sage of a fairly liberal displaced persons law. Retaliation followed the 
same year however, when McCarran introduced his Internal Security 
Act. The law provided for the establishment of a subversive activi-
ties control board, which registered members of communist and front 
organizations, denied passports and government positions to Marxist 
sympathizers, intensified espionage legislation and made the extradi-
tion of subversive aliens easier. Liberals opposed the bill, but it still 
passed Congress on 20 September. President Truman did not want 
to sign it. He thought the McCarran Act laid the cornerstone for the 
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creation of a totalitarian state, with little regard for basic civil liberties, 
either of foreigners or U.S citizens. Truman therefore sent the bill back 
to Capitol Hill. The House and Senate were not impressed by Truman’s 
veto, however. Congress overrode it, and the Internal Security Act of 
1950 became law on 23 September. It became a powerful weapon for 
congressional guardians of Jim Crow, who would use the act to perse-
cute all agents of progressive change, including civil rights workers and 
labour activists.44
Conclusion: Jim Crow Goes Global
Jim Crow Democrats based their Cold War policy decisions on a 
white supremacist worldview. Their support for the reconstruction of 
Germany, the Marshall Plan and a strict displaced persons law was con-
nected to the defence of the existing race and class system in the U.S. 
South. The danger of communist expansion and infiltration and the 
post-war process of decolonization posed a menace to traditional power 
structures, both at home and abroad. The southern economy relied on 
free markets, military spending and cheap labour. Racial and class iden-
tity determined social status in the American South. Issues of race and 
labour were therefore intimately linked in the southern states, which 
made politicians from the area very apprehensive about the advance-
ment of human rights, not only by the U.S. government, but also through 
the United Nations. Because human rights advocates promoted political 
and socioeconomic justice, white southerners considered their message 
a direct danger to established race and class relations in the region.
World War II not only transformed the international system of poli-
tics, but also caused massive change within the United States, particu-
larly in the South. This process had already started with the New Deal, 
but accelerated during the war. The mechanization of agriculture, (mili-
tary) industrialization in the southern states and the rise of the civil 
rights movement strained class and race relations in the region. African 
American veterans who returned home after defeating fascism formed 
the vanguard in the battle for racial equality. They pointed out the para-
dox of American foreign policy: while the United States claimed to be 
fighting for freedom and democracy abroad, a system of institutional-
ized segregation was still firmly in place in a large part of the country.
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Segregationists often conflated Americanism with anti-communism 
to present their Jim Crow agenda as the epitome of U.S. constitutional-
ism. As such, opponents of the southern status quo – civil rights and 
labour activists at home, left-wing freedom fighters abroad – automati-
cally became dangerous Soviet sympathizers. The domestic defence of 
segregation also translated into strong southern backing for anti-commu-
nist strongmen after World War II, like Francisco Franco of Spain and 
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.45 In 1958 for instance, James 
Eastland teamed up with his Republican colleague William Jenner to 
personally address Trujillo. ‘Thank God for your country and for your 
leadership for freedom, for capitalism, and for free enterprise’, Eastland 
told the ruthless dictator.46 The Mississippi senator was not the only Jim 
Crow Democrat who travelled to the Dominican Republic and wrote 
about it in lofty terms. U.S. Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina vis-
ited the country in 1957 and contrasted the situation there with political 
instability in Haiti. ‘My recent travels through Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic provided an excellent basis for comparison between two gov-
ernments sharing the same island’, he observed, ‘one torn by communis-
tic-inspired instability and the other stable, firm, and well organized’.47 In 
his travel report, Johnston utilized longstanding racialized tropes about 
Haiti. The origins of these tropes can be traced back to the antebellum 
era, when Haiti gained independence through an uprising of its enslaved 
population and slavery in the southern United States began to expand.48
Besides anti-communism, Eastland and other segregationists from 
the United States thus could relate to Trujillo on other levels too. He 
forcefully ran the country as his own (sugar) plantation and created a 
colour line between Dominicans and darker-skinned Haitians that must 
have appeared familiar to Jim Crow apologists. ‘Trujillo as farmer, 
worker, and industrialist promised to create a society with no castes… 
no blackness – one of only Dominicans united against Haitians’, histo-
rian Lauren Derby wrote. ‘If blackness in this context was a metaphor 
for social inequality, the Era of Trujillo promised to make whiteness 
available to all Dominicans by incorporating them in the modern 
nation’.49 Continued U.S. support for dictatorial regimes during the 
early Cold War reflected southern ideas about national security and a 
world order safe for American interests.50
The notion of freedom in the Jim Crow South was shaped by the 
fear of national and international revolutionary change, instigated by 
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communist sympathizers, independence fighters and human rights 
activists. The vast national and international transformations that 
occurred after World War II filled advocates of Jim Crow with anxi-
ety. The communist advance inside and outside the United States, for 
them exemplified by the civil rights movement on the one hand and the 
Red Army on the other, had to be stopped. When viewed from this per-
spective, the Marshall Plan became an instrument to protect the white 
South’s interests, not only in the field of economics, but also in the field 
of race. Immediately after the Nazis were defeated, Germany became 
part of a global ecosystem of white supremacy created by proponents 
of Jim Crow democracy who wanted to protect their racialized vision 
of Americanism and spread it across the world. At the same time, this 
racialized vision defined white southern views during the displaced per-
sons debate in the United States.
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